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Recent work in macroeconomics emphasizes the role of credit in the
transmission mechanism for monetary policy and as a propagation
mechanism of business cycle shocks.1 While much evidence has been
gathered, not all researchers agree on the relevance of credit for the
transmission of monetary policy or as a propagation mechanism of
business cycle shocks. For the most part, every one agrees on the facts
at hand but differs on their interpretation. In short, the argument is over
identification. The primary purposes of this paper are to clarify the
identification issues involved; to highlight those identification schemes
that are promising avenues for measuring the importance of credit in
aggregate fluctuations; and to discuss both previous and new evidence
in light of the identification schemes proposed.
The role of credit in the monetary transmission mechanism can be
divided into two separate phenomena. The first has been dubbed the
"credit channel" of monetary policy. The second has been called the
"financial accelerator." Both rely on credit frictions that are absent in
the standard neoclassical models that economists typically use to explain
business cycle fluctuations. Both, however, are complementary to the
standard "’money channel" described in textbook treatments of mone-
tary transmission. As such, they provide an additional rather than a
competing mechanism for the propagation of monetary policy shocks.
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serve Bank of New York, respectively. The authors thank Mark Gertler for valuable
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The credit channel emphasizes the importance of bank lending in
the monetary transmission mechanism. The existence of the credit
channel presumes that capital markets are imperfect, owing to informa-
tion asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. As a consequence,
some borrowers are unable to borrow on the open market without
paying large premiums on external finance. Banks specialize in infor-
mation-intensive loans and are able to reduce the premium for bank-
dependent borrowers. Monetary policy has real consequences because
of its effect on banks’ ability to lend. Open market operations lead to a
contraction in reserves and a decrease in funds available for lending.
As long as banks face imperfections in issuing certificates of deposit
(CDs) to offset the contraction in reserves, bank lending must fall.
Bank-dependent borrowers, consequently, are forced to seek funds at
a much higher cost on the open market--to the extent they are able to
obtain funds at all. As a result, spending by bank-dependent borrowers
contracts.
The financial accelerator emphasizes the importance of balance
sheet conditions in propagating shocks to the economy. As with the
credit channel, the existence of the financial accelerator depends on the
assumption that capital markets are imperfect, and that external and
internal finance are not perfect substitutes. The crucial point for the
financial accelerator is that the size of the premium on external funds
depends on the firm’s balance sheet condition. As balance sheets~
deteriorate following a contractionary monetary policy--regardless of
whether the initial effect comes through interest rates or the initial
decline in spending by bank-dependent borrowers--premiums on ex-
ternal finance rise, exacerbating the overall decline in spending.
Because the financial accelerator relies only on the assumption of
credit market frictions and not on the additional assumption that a
contraction in reserves limits banks’ ability to lend, it is both a broader
phenomenon than the credit channel and a necessary condition for the
existence of the credit channel. Thus, evidence in favor of the financial
accelerator is crucial for proving the existence of the credit channel,
while the converse is not true.
All convincing evidence in favor of either a credit channel or the
financial accelerator comes from studies that focus on the differential
behavior of agents. This is the premise of our paper. The focus on
differential behavior is important for two reasons. First, models that
incorporate financial frictions are more relevant for certain types of
agents, certain classes of borrowers, and certain sectors of the economy.
The propagation mechanisms generated by these models are more
relevant at certain points in the business cycle, namely, when cash flows
are dropping and balance sheets are deteriorating. Second, because of
the difficulties associated with formulating and estimating true struc-
tural models, empirical exercises seeking to establish the validity ofTHE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT FOR MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY 131
either a credit channel or a financial accelerator must make comparisons
against benchmarks where such credit effects are less likely to be
relevant. By observing and measuring the differential behavior of
economic agents under consideration, one can potentially attribute
some, if not all, of the difference in behavior to frictions caused by credit
markets. We elaborate on this premise in the next section. We then turn
to a discussion of the existing evidence and provide some new evidence
on the relevance of credit for monetary policy and macroeconomic
fluctuations.
To limit the scope of the discussion, we address only firm behavior,
although all of the identification issues apply equally well to consumers;
see Attanasio (1994) for a recent discussion of credit issues on the
consumer side. To further limit the scope of the paper, we center the
discussion around evidence generated from one data set: the U.S.
Bureau of the Census’s Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing,
Mining and Trade Corporations (QFR). Thus, a secondary purpose of this
paper is to provide a progress report on research using the QFR data.
Because it is available at high frequency and at various levels of
aggregation, the QFR data set is uniquely suited for analyzing credit
issues and how they relate to macroeconomics. As will be discussed
below, the QFR data have already provided valuable insights into the
identification issues raised by credit market imperfections. In addition,
the QFR data have provided substantial evidence in favor of a credit
mechanism, especially through the financial accelerator described above.
IDENTIFICATION THROUGH ]-~ETEROGENEITY
To understand the essential role that heterogeneity plays in any
identification scheme used to measure the importance of credit in the
economy, it is useful to review briefly the theoretical underpinnings that
motivate the existence of a premium on external funds, and how such a
premium would respond to changes in interest rates and aggregate
demand conditions. We then turn to a discussion of financial interme-
diaries and the role of monetary policy.
As a starting point, consider the implications of neoclassical invest-
ment theory. According to this theory, firms make investment decisions
to maximize the net present value of profits. If interest rates rise, the net
present value of profits falls, making investment less attractive. If
expected future profits fall, net present value also falls, once again
leading to a drop in investment spending. It is important to note that the
firm’s investment decision depends entirely on the future returns of the
specific project under consideration and not on the current or past
financial position of the firm. If the firm must borrow to complete
or undertake the investment project, creditors are willing to lend the
necessary funds at the current open-market interest rate. Thus, we have132 Simon G. Gilehrist and Egon Zakraj~el~
the celebrated Modigliani-Miller (1958) result that real and financial
decisions of the firm are completely separable.
In the presence of capital market imperfections, the separation of
real and financial decisions no longer occurs. Balance sheet conditions
affect the firm’s ability to borrow at current interest rates. The theoretical
motivation for this link can be found in the vast literature on asymmetric
information and moral hazard in credit markets. An important insight
from this literature is that such credit market imperfections create a
wedge between the costs of external and internal finance. This wedge
exists to compensate lenders for the risk that a borrower may either
ex ante misrepresent the value of a given investment project or ex post
behave in a manner that expropriates value from the lender. To mitigate
such risk, the lender must monitor the borrower, incurring costs in the
process.
In general, the premium on external funds will be highest where
information asymmetries are the most severe and where the risk of
opportunistic behavior is hardest to mitigate. Thus, small firms with
idiosyncratic projects that are more difficult to value than those of large
firms will face higher premiums. Younger firms with returns less known
to the market will face higher premiums. By the same token, firms with
projects backed by collateral will face lower premiums. More generally,
the lower the collateralizable net worth of the firm, the greater the
premium on external funds.
An example of such a situation is displayed in Figure 1.2 The dd line
represents the demand for funds by the firm. It is a downward-sloping
function of the cost of funds. The ss line represents the supply of funds.
Up to the point W (the firm’s net worth), lenders face very little risk of
opportunistic behavior and are willing to lend at the open market
interest rate. Beyond W, however, lenders charge a premium over the
open-market rate to compensate for the increased probability of oppor-
tunistic behavior on the part of borrowers. Because of the premium on
external funds, the supply of funds curve for the individual firm is
upward-sloping, leading to an investment level I*, below the perfect
markets level IP.
While the under-investment result is interesting in its own right,
what matters for understanding the effects of monetary policy shocks
is how the premium on external funds varies with both the state of
aggregate demand and the risk-free interest rate. We consider both in
turn. Figure 1A shows the effects of a rise in demand. In the perfect
2 This example is based on the costly state verification (CSV) model presented in
Gertler and Gilchrist (1991). Early examples of CSV models are Townsend (1979), Gale and
Hellwig (1985), and Williamson (1987). Additional models that incorporate financial
frictions in various guises include Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jaffe and Russell (1976),
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markets case, as demand increases, expected future profits rise, making
firms more willing to invest. This shifts out the demand curve to dd’ and
raises investment spending for a given cost of funds. The credit market
frictions amplify this effect. At higher profit levels, net worth has
increased for a given project size, and the benefits of reneging on
contractual obligations are lower. Borrowers are less likely to default,
and lenders need not monitor as often. With less monitoring, the
required premium on external funds falls (a rightward shift in the ss
curve), and the effect of the demand shock on investment spending is
magnified.
A rise in risk-free rates has a similar magnification effect, as shown
in Figure lB. At higher interest rates, default probabilities rise, causing
lenders to increase the premium on external funds. An increase in the
premium puts firms at even greater risk of default. This leads to an
increase in the required premium that is much larger than the rise in the
open-market interest rate. Once again, the initial shock is magnified
through its effect on the premium for external funds.
The connection between the financial accelerator and the credit
channel is easily understood, once one recognizes the special role that
banks play in the credit intermediation process. Given the high cost ofTHE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT FOR MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY 135
obtaining information for certain classes of borrowers, it is natural to
expect certain institutions to specialize in information-gathering activi-
ties. Traditionally, banks have performed this role, in part because of the
information advantage they obtain through observing would-be-bor-
rowers’ deposit flows.3 Over time, institutions such as banks develop
knowledge specific to their dass of borrowers in general and to their
own customers in particular. By reducing the information asymmetry,
financial intermediaries can lower the premium on external funds.
Because such knowledge is difficult to convey to third-party lenders,
disruptions in the supply of credit available through these intermediar-
ies can have immediate and large consequences on spending.4 With
traditional borrowing relationships destroyed, many bank-dependent
firms and consumers will be forced into the market, where they face stiff
premiums on external funds. At the prevailing rates, many may simply
forgo planned investment projects, leading to large sudden drops in
spending by certain classes of borrowers.
The link between theory and empirical work is established by
determining factors that are likely to influence the size of the premium
on external finance, the degree of the magnification effects, and the
extent to which a firm must rely on bank loans rather than some other
form of finance less subject to supply shocks through open market
operations. Both the size of the premium on external finance and the
degree to which a firm is tied to the bank loan market rather than other
forms of external finance are heavily influenced by the firm’s size, age
and previous financial track record. Industry-specific characteristics
such as the riskiness of projects, the degree to which investments are
collateralizable, and the difficulty associated with evaluating borrowers’
claims are also likely to be important determinants of the premium on
external funds. By comparing the behavior of firms with such charac-
teristics relative to the behavior of firms that have little difficulty
obtaining funds at the open-market rate, we can test for the presence of
financial frictions and measure the extent to which these frictions distort
firm hiring and investment patterns.
3 Fama (1980) outlines the special role of banks; Himmelberg and Morgan (1995)
provide a more recent discussion.
4 A central issue in the literature, of course, is the link between monetary policy and
credit supply disruptions. According to the traditional credit view, contractions in
monetary policy drain reserves from the system and force a contraction on both the asset
and the liability sides of the balance sheet. As long as banks do not face a perfectly elastic
supply-of-funds schedule in the CD market, monetary policy contractions reduce the
supply of bank loans. Romer and Romer (1990) forcefully argue against any such link
between reserve contractions and loan supply, owing to the ability of banks to issue
certificates of deposit not subject to reserve requirements. Kashyap and Stein (1994), on
the other hand, argue in favor of such a link; see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a recent
discussion of the issues and the evidence.136 Simon G. Gilehrist and Egon Zakraj~ek
For the magnification effect, a key determinant of the premium on
external funds is W--the net worth of the firm, or the level of unen-
cumbered assets or future earnings available as collateral for new in-
vestment projects. Given the complexity of present day financial con-
tracts, it is difficult to quantify such a concept precisely. Nonetheless,
some basic indicators of financial health commonly used by market
analysts seem informative. Firms with high leverage ratios are likely to
face greater difficulties obtaining new funds on the market, as are firms
with low coverage ratios--that is, firms with a high level of current
interest payments relative to their earnings. By using disaggregated data
to compare the behavior of firms in different financial positions, we can
potentially measure the distortions created by financial frictions.
In addition to being useful indicators of firms with imperfect access
to credit markets, both of these variables are intuitively appealing in
understanding the asymmetric nature of the financial accelerator dis-
cussed above. In good times, as profits increase and firms become flush
with cash, borrowers have little trouble financing new investment
projects and making existing debt payments. Under such conditions, a
shock to earnings or interest rates will have very little magnification
effect through the premium on external funds. As the economy turns
down and balance sheet positions are weakened, however, a greater
number of firms find themselves saddled with large debt, high interest
payments, and low cash flow. In such precarious financial positions,
these firms will face high premiums on external funds, either through
direct price effects, credit rationing, or more severe non-price contract
terms such as restrictive debt covenants. With only aggregate time
series, however, one cannot identify the extent to which firms are
moving from one class to another and, therefore, how important a credit
mechanism is in creating business cycle asymmetries.
The identification strategy of comparing one class of firms to
another in order to measure the extent and importance of financial
frictions takes advantage of the inherent heterogeneity underlying most
aggregate time series data. In addition, it emphasizes the limitations of
models that focus on representative agents. The limitation of represen-
tative agent models does not come from our inability to formulate
representative agent models with important credit frictions.5 Rather, the
limitation comes from our inability to distinguish such models from
business cycle models with alternative propagation mechanisms that do
not rely on credit frictions. Only by relying on the fact that some firms,
at least some of the time, do not face the adverse consequences
associated with limited access to credit markets, can we identify how
other firms, at other times, are seriously affected by such restricted access.
5 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) present one example of such models.THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT FOR MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY 137
EVIDENCE FROM FINANCIAL DATA
We now turn to a discussion of identification through the use of
financial data, focusing on the comparison between aggregate lending
data and disaggregated lending data. We argue that only disaggregated
lending data can provide convincing evidence of the presence of either
a credit channel or the financial accelerator. We also wish to emphasize
that evidence from lending data alone is not sufficient to establish the
relevance of credit frictions in propagating and amplifying business
cycle shocks. Also needed is supporting evidence from non financial
data. This is discussed in the next section.
Interpreting the Existing Evidence
Prominent studies that attempt to gauge the importance of credit in
the macroeconomy have focused on the following criterion: To what
extent do movements in aggregate credit or aggregate bank loans either
explain or lead movements in real variables? Both King (1986) and
Ramey (1993) show that total bank lending has no marginal forecasting
power for either industrial production or other macro real variables.
Romer and Romer (1990) show that monetary aggregates fall immedi-
ately following a shift to tight monetary policy and nine months prior to
the ensuing drop in output, whereas bank loans fall only coincidently
with the resulting decline in output. These results are taken by the
authors as strong evidence against a credit channel for monetary policy
and, at least in King’s case, as strong evidence against credit mattering
at all for the transmission of monetary policy shocks.6
As Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), and
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994) all emphasize, however, such
empirical exercises do not provide information on either the relevance of
a credit channel for monetary policy or the presence of a financial
accelerator. First, banks liquidate securities rather than contract loan
volume immediately following a tightening of monetary policy. Banks
do so in part to offset the effects that tight money will have on their
ability to lend to valued customers. Thus, tl~e fact that bank loans only
fall with a nine-month lag rather than immediately following a switch to
tight monetary policy provides no information about banks’ ability to
obtain funds through CD issuance and, consequently, cannot be con-
sidered as a relevant test for the existence of a credit channel.
Second, the notion that bank lending should have marginal predic-
tive power, once one controls for monetary policy through either a
6 Both Ramey (1993) and Romer and Romer (1990) are careful to point out, however,
that their findings do not provide evidence against the importance of a broader credit
mechanism such as the financial accelerator.138 Simon G. Gilchrist and Egon Zakraj~ek
monetary aggregate or an interest rate instrument such as the federal
funds rate, assumes that credit disruptions provide an important inde-
pendent source of shocks. According to the general equilibrium theories
linking balance sheet conditions to real activity, however, no such
shocks need exist.7 The financial accelerator is an amplification device,
not an independent source of variation. Although disruptions to credit
supply--through independent shocks to bank lending such as changes
in regulatory policy, for example--may have large effects, such shocks
need not be empirically important for credit to matter in conditioning
the economy’s overall response to either changes in monetary policy or
other sources of variation.
Finally, once it is recognized that the effects of credit frictions on
debt quantities are most likely identified through the differential behav-
ior of certain classes of borrowers, the relevance of any exercise that
focuses only on aggregate lending patterns must be questioned. Kash-
yap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) (KSW hereafter) were the first to make this
point empirically. They argued that a credit channel for monetary policy
could be identified more readily through the differential behavior of
bank loans relative to commercial paper movements than by looking
only at total lending. According to KSW, bank loans would shrink fol-
lowing tight money, whereas commercial paper would expand, in part
because customers shut out of the bank loan market would naturally
turn to commercial paper.
The evidence presented by KSW supports this contention. Bank
loans drop relative to commercial paper following tight money, though
the mechanism is not quite what KSW described. Using even more
disaggregated data for the manufacturing sector, both Oliner and
Rudebusch (1992) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) show that movements
in the aggregate mix between commercial paper and bank loans are not
driven by bank versus nonbank lending but by small-firm versus
large-firm borrowing. In particular, following tight money, all types of
borrowing by small firms fall, whereas borrowing by large firms actually
expands in the first few quarters following a monetary contraction.
The expansion of credit to large firms following tight money is not
often recognized and is worth emphasizing in the context of identifying
the effects of monetary policy shocks through aggregate lending behav-
ior. As Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) point out, many firms have a strong
countercyclical demand for short-term credit, as inventories rise and
cash flows fall in the first few quarters following a tightening of
monetary policy or at a business cycle turning point. If funds were
7 Examples of dynamic general equilibrium models that incorporate a financial
accelerator include Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990),
Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Gertler (1992), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1993).THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT FOR MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY 139
available at prevailing open-market rates, all firms would increase their
borrowing to smooth the effect of declining cash flows. Only those firms
with relatively unimpeded access to credit, however, are able to obtain
the desired funds. Thus, following a shift to tight money, "high-quality"
firms with access to the commercial paper market expand their credit
(Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel 1995); firms with bank commit-
ments draw down their lines of credit (Morgan 1994); and the "high-
quality" bank customers receive the funds obtained through the bank-
ing system’s liquidation of securities (Lang and Nakamura 1995). Those
left out in the cold are the smaller, riskier, less-valued bank customers,
which, once shut out of the bank loan market, have no recourse but to
curtail operations, liquidate inventories, cut investment spending, and
reduce their work force. Their reductions in spending further exacerbate
the downturn, leading to an even greater contraction than before.
Once the countercyclical demand for credit generated by an adverse
shock to monetary policy is recognized, it becomes immediately obvious
that important credit frictions may be at work with very little observable
effect on aggregate credit quantities, especially over the first few
quarters following a switch to tight monetary policy. If this were the
case, we would not necessarily expect any observable relationship
between aggregate credit movements and future output movements.
We would expect, however, an observable relationship between the
differential borrowing rates of high-quality versus low-quality borrowers
and future output movements, especially in a framework that does not
control for the original source of the shock. In addition, we would expect
monetary policy to have a strong effect on the relative borrowing
patterns of these two types of firms.
Some New Evidence from Financial Data
In this section, we test the proposition that the borrowing rates of
"’low-quality" firms relative to those of "high-quality" firms have
predictive power for aggregate real variables. We also test the proposi-
tion that differential movements in such borrowing rates are influenced
by monetary policy. To obtain a debt measure for "low-quality" and
"high-quality" firms, we follow Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and use the
ratio of short-term debt of small manufacturing firms relative to short-
term debt of all manufacturing firms, constructed from the published
QFR data. We call this ratio the small/all mix.s We view the first test as
8 Other lending variables that reflect potential differences in borrower quality are
available, though generally not for as long a time period. In addition, the QFR data are
disaggregated by size as well as by type of debt (for example, bank vs. nonbank,
commercial paper, and so on). The data are therefore well-suited for making additional140 Simon G. Gilehrist and Egon Zakraj~ek
complementary to Ramey (1993), who uses the QFR data to examine the
predictive power of short-term debt issued by small firms relative to that
of large firms for aggregate industrial production. We view the second
test as complementary to the evidence presented in Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993), who characterize the behavior of small-firm and large-firm
borrowing in response to monetary policy shocks, using impulse re-
sponse functions. In addition, both tests complement the analysis of
small-firm versus large-firm borrowing patterns provided by Oliner and
Rudebusch (1992).
We test the first proposition by examining the predictive power of
the small/all mix for the following measures of aggregate economic
activity: real GNP, manufacturing industrial production, manufacturing
inventories, and manufacturing employment.9 We also examine the
predictive power of the small- and large-firm debt series separately, as
well as the relative behavior of bank and nonbank debt for small and
large firms. Table I reports the results of these exercises in the context of
a bivariate VAR system. The top panel reports probability values from
the exclusion tests for each debt variable across the various measures of
real economic activity.10 The bottom panel reports the t-statistics for the
sums of coefficients on the debt variables and, thus, provides an indi-
cation of the sign of the effect that each debt variable has on real activity.
The bivariate results provide strong support for the hypothesis that
credit flows between small and large firms predict real economic
activity. The probability values from the exclusion test for the small/all
mix are less than 0.01 in three out of the four cases. In addition, the
t-statistics on the sums of coefficients indicate that an increase in the
small/all debt ratio leads to a highly significant increase in the growth
rates of GNP, manufacturing industrial production, and manufacturing
employment, as one would expect. The effect on inventories is ambig-
uous and probably reflects the dynamics associated with unexpected
inventory buildup following a slowdown in economic activity.
Separating these variables by small firms versus large firms and
comparisons of bank vs. nonbank debt. We focus on short-term rather than long-term debt
to avoid the measurement problems associated with disentangling stocks and flows when
only stocks are observable. As Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) show, the overall condusions
regarding disaggregated debt movements do not depend on the use of short-term rather
than long-term credit quantities. In addition, Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) provide similar
evidence based on total debt.
9 We focus on the manufacturing variables since the lending data are constructed
using manufacturing firms only. Ramey (1993) provides a similar test of predictive power
for aggregate industrial production alone, although she uses the ratio of small- to
large-firm borrowing rather than small- to all-firm borrowing. Since these variables are
simple transformations of each other, it makes very little difference which one is used.
lo We start the estimation in 1975: QI to allow for the fact that credit conditions may
have changed following the regulatory change that allowed banks to issue large time
deposits without being subject to reserve requirements.THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT FOR MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY 141
Table 1
Short-Term Debt and Aggregate Economic Activity: Results from a Bivariate
VAR System




Debt Variable GNP Prod. Inventories Employment
Manufacturing Mixa .04 .01 .08 ,07
Large Firm Mixb .76 .32 .79 .56
Small/All Mixc .00 .00 .07 .00
Small Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt .84 .28 .74 .62
Short-Term Nonbank Debt .80 .19 .82 .47
Large Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt .02 .00 ,05 .02
Short-Term Nonbank Debt .01 .00 .07 .01
t-statistics on Sums of Coefficients for Debt Variables
Real
Debt Variable GNP
Manufacturing Mixa 2.75 2.60
Large Firm Mixb .73 .73
Small/All Mixc 4.31 3.87
Small Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt -.12 -1.06











Short-Term Bank Debt -3.17 -3.96 - 1.08 -3,37
Short-Term Nonbank Debt -3.52 -4.35 -.83 -3.52
Notes: The bivariate system includes four lags of the growth rate of the dependent variable and four lags
.d the growth rate of the debt variable. Sample range: 1975: QI to 1991:QIV.
a Ratio of short-term bank loans to commercial paper plus short-term bank loans, for all manufacturing
firms.
b Ratio of short-term bank loans to commercial paper plus short-term bank loans, for firms above the 30th
percentile in sales.
° Ratio of short-term debt for firms below the 30th percentile in sales relative to short-term debt of all firms.
bank versus nonbank debt indicates a number of interesting patterns.
First, differences in the predictive power of debt variables arise through
differences in class of borrower and not through differences in class of
debt. Thus, bank debt and nonbank debt behave in a similar manner,
but small-firm versus large-firm debt does not. In particular, for large142 Simon G. Gilchrist and Egon Zakrajgek
firms, increases in either bank or nonbank debt predict declines in real
economic activity, while for small firms the opposite occurs. Although
the similarity in predictive power of bank versus nonbank debt provides
potential evidence against a "direct credit channel" for monetary policy,
it is important to be cautious with this interpretation. As argued above,
we would expect banks to continue to make loans to their larger, more
valued customers as they sell off securities. In addition, for small firms,
the nonbank category is very small and is not as reliable an indicator of
credit behavior.11
Second, the t-statistics and p-values for exclusion tests of the first
three lending variables confirm that the predictive power of the mix
between bank loans and commercial paper for manufacturing comes
entirely through the ratio of small-firm borrowing relative to total
borrowing (that is, the small/all mix) and not through differential
movements between bank loans and commercial paper by firms with
potential access to both markets.12 This finding further supports the
evidence presented in Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), Gertler and Gil-
christ (1993), and Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) that
differential movements between bank loans and commercial paper
reflect differential movements in debt by type of borrower and not by
type of debt.
Finally, it is worth noting that much of the predictive power of the
small/all mix can be captured by looking only at large-firm behavior in
the bivariate regressions. When these regressions are augmented to
include other variables such as the federal funds rate and inflation, as
in Table 2, the predictive power of large-firm debt variables vanishes,
while the small/all mix still retains significant predictive power for the
growth rates of GNP, manufacturing inventories, and manufacturing
employment. Overall, we find that the ratio of small-firm borrowing
relative to total borrowing has both the predictive power and sign one
would expect based on credit theories.
The second prediction to be tested is whether monetary policy has
any effect on the borrowing patterns of small and large firms. To test this
hypothesis, each debt variable is regressed on four lags of itself and four
lags of the federal funds rate. We also consider a multivariate specifica-
tion that includes the growth rate of industrial production for the
manufacturing sector. The probability values from exclusion tests and
11 It is also possible that some firms are pushed out of the commercial paper market
into the bank loan market as their credit quality deteriorates. Such an effect would mute
any differential response for large firms.
12 Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that manufacturing firms with total assets of less
than $250 million have virtually no commercial paper outstanding. In addition, 90 percent
of manufacturing commercial paper is issued by firms with total assets greater than $1
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Table 2
Short-Term Debt and Aggregate Economic Activity: Results from a Multivariate
VAR System




Debt Variable GNP Prod. Inventories Employment
Manufacturing Mixa .40 .17 .21 ,36
Large Firm Mixb .91 .52 ,98 .73
Small/All Mix° .05 .13 .02 .06
Small Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt .98 .36 .55 .67
Short-Term Nonbank Debt .95 .35 .77 .65
Large Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt .32 .11 .02 .13
Short-Term Nonbank Debt .28 .11 ,06 ,11




Debt Variable GNP Prod. Inventories Employment
Manufacturing Mixa 1.61 1.43 1.95 1.20
Large Firm Mixb .15 .11 .16 -,12
Small/All Mix° 2.69 2.27 2.59 2.31
Small Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt .17 -1.04 .27 -.38
Short-Term Nonbank Debt .33 -.91 .43 -.22
Large Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt - 1.85 -2.70 - 1.97 -2.49
Short-Term Nonbank Debt -1.70 -2.68 -1.66 -2.28
Notes: The multivariate system includes four lags of the growth rate of the dependent variable, four lags
of the growth rate of the debt variable, and four lags of the change in the federal funds rate. Sample
range: 1975:QI to 1991:QIV.
"Ratio of short-term bank loans to commercial paper plus short-term bank loans for a~l manufacturing
firms.
b Ratio of short-term bank loans to commercial paper plus short-term bank loans for firms above the 30th
percentile in sales.
° Ratio of short-term debt for firms below the 30th percentile in sales relative to short-term debt of all firms.
t-statistics for sums of coefficients on the federal funds rate are reported
in Table 3. The results from both the exclusion tests and the tests of
sums of coefficients provide strong support for the hypothesis that
monetary policy significantly affects the differential growth rates of
short-term debt between small and large firms. In particular, an increase144 Simon G. Gilchrist and Egon Zakraj~ek
Table 3
The Effect of the Federal Funds Rate on Short-Term Debt
p-values from Exclusion Tests on the Federal Funds Rate
Bivariate Multivariate
Debt Variable System~’ Systemb
Manufacturing Mix° .12 .31
Large Firm Mix’~ .82 .95
Small/All Mix’~ .00 .06
Small Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt .01 .13
Short-Term Nonbank Debt .02 .13
Large Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt .00 .26
Short-Term Nonbank Debt .00 .10
t-statistics on Sums of Coefficients of the Federal Funds Rate
Bivariate Multivariate
Debt Variable Systema Systemb
Manufacturing Mix° -2.35 -1.90
Large Firm Mixd -.50 -.69
Small/All Mixe -3,81 -2.70
Small Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt 1.59 .05
Short-Term Nonbank Debt 1.53 .14
Large Firm
Short-Term Bank Debt 3.29 2.07
Short-Term Nonbank Debt 3.61 2.44
a The bivariate system includes four lags of the growth rate of the debt variable and four lags of the
change in the federal funds rate.
b The multivariate system includes four lags of the growth rate of the debt variable, four lags of the
change in the federal funds rate, and four lags of the growth rate of manufacturing industrial production.
c Ratio of short-term bank loans to commercial paper plus short-term bank loans for all manufacturing
firms.
d Ratio of short-term bank loans to commercial paper plus short-term bank loans for firms above the 30th
percentile in sales.
e Ratio of short-term debt for firms below the 30th percentile in sales relative to short-term debt of all firms.
in the federal funds rate leads to a contraction of small-firm borrowing
relative to large-firm borrowing.
In conclusion, the evidence from financial data disaggregated by
size class in manufacturing confirms the fact that the differences in
short-term borrowing behavior between small and large firms have
substantial predictive power for real economic activity. In addition, the
data are consistent with the view that monetary policy plays a crucial
role in determining the pattern of such differences in borrowing behav-
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EVIDENCE FROM NONFINANCIAL DATA
While consistent with a role for credit in the economy, the evidence
using financial data alone cannot solve the identification problems
posed by the literature. We must ask why funds flow from one class of
borrower to another, and why such flows might have forecasting power
for aggregate economic activity. One alternative explanation that does
not rely on credit is that small, bank-dependent firms are subject to a
different set of shock processes and adjustment mechanisms than large
firms, or firms identified as having free access to credit markets. If, for
example, small firms are on the fringes of the industrial process as
suppliers or niche market producers, they may well be subject to more
rapid and deeper contractions than their large-firm counterparts. If this
were true, we might indeed expect the ratio of small- to all-firm bor-
rowing to respond to monetary policy shocks and lead the business
cycle, as the above evidence suggests.
Two approaches can be taken to solving the identification problem
here. The first approach is to rely on additional time series evidence that
is also consistent with a credit interpretation but much harder to explain
with an alternative non-credit-related phenomenon. The other approach
is to go directly to micro data and control for as many of the alternative
shock and adjustment processes as possible, using both reduced-form
and structural techniques. We discuss both in turn.
Evidence from the Aggregate QFR Data
To identify credit effects through time series data, one must have
a data set that provides both a long time series dimension and enough
heterogeneity to form a basis of comparison between agents with
differential access to capital markets. By providing balance sheet and
income statement data over the period from 1959:QI to 1991:QIV across
different size classes of manufacturing firms, the QFR data are uniquely
suited to the task. Using these data, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) provide
substantial evidence on the differential behavior of small versus large
firms over the business cycle and in response to monetary policy shocks.
Regardless of the source of this differential behavior, the Gertler-
Gilchrist evidence is striking. Following a shift to tight monetary policy,
the contraction of small manufacturing firms~defined as firms in the
bottom 30th percentile of the sales distribution is 2.5 times greater than
that of large firms, over a 12-quarter horizon. This contraction can be
seen across a wide variety of variables, but it is most noticeable in sales,
inventories, and short-term borrowing. While one could potentially
explain the differential response of sales with an alternative demand
story, it is much harder to explain the differential response of the
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evidence clearly suggests that large firms obtain additional funds to
finance inventories as sales are declining, whereas small firms do not. In
addition, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994) show that controlling
for industry-specific demand conditions does not substantially reduce
the differential response of the inventory/sales ratio between small and
large firms, as one would expect if a demand-baSed alternative were the
true explanation.
Perhaps the most compelling evidence from a skeptic’s point of
view is the finding that spending by small firms is highly responsive to
current credit conditions, even after controlling for the lagged dynamics
normally associated with spending equations. Two pieces of evidence
are relevant here. The first piece is the finding by Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) that inventory investment by small firms is highly responsive to
a coverage variable that measures the ratio of income to short-term debt
payments, whereas inventory investment by large firms is not. Thus,
balance sheet conditions affect real decisions for small firms but not for
large firms. This is true even after controlling for alternative sales
processes and inventory adjustment speeds. A related piece of evidence
is the finding by Oliner and Rudebusch (1994) that business fixed
investment by small firms is highly responsive to cash flow shocks
during recessionary periods. Such an asymmetric response arises natu-
rally from a model with credit frictions but is much more difficult to
reconcile with a model that assumes perfect capital markets.
Evidence from the Firm-Level QFR Data
While the time series evidence based on small versus large manu-
facturing firms paints a compelling picture of the process one would
expect to observe if credit conditions play an important role in both the
monetary transmission mechanism and business cycle fluctuations, the
fact that the data are aggregated by size rather than by a more direct
indicator of capital market access is a major limitation. Additional
problems are posed by attempts to control for industry effects and other
aggregation issues. Fortunately, the underlying firm-level data set that
is used to construct the published QFR data aggregated by size class is
available through the Center for Economic Studies at the U.S. Bureau of
the Census for the period 1977:QI to 1991:QIII. Unlike Compustat or
other firm-level data bases more commonly used in micro studies that
seek to identify the effect of credit frictions on real behavior, the
firm-level QFR data set is comprehensive for manufacturing, covering
all corporations and not just publicly traded ones.~3 The fact that the
13 In fact, the firm-level QFR data form the only known U.S. data base that
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data set is comprehensive implies that one can correctly aggregate
results to obtain macroeconomic implications. The quarterly frequency
of the data allows one to consider issues at a business cycle frequency.
While work on this data base is preliminary, some interesting results
have already emerged. We discuss these results again in the context of
identifying the role of credit in the macroeconomy.
The principal identification problem posed at the micro level is, how
does one separate a firm’s response to a change in its financial position
from its response to new profit opportunities? This identification prob-
lem can be easily understood in the context of standard firm-level
investment regressions. As discussed above in the section "Identifica-
tion through Heterogeneity," a positive shock to profits has two effects.
First, to the extent that high profitability today signals high profitability
tomorrow, firms will want to invest more. This is the standard neoclas-
sical response. Second, higher profits today signal greater net worth and
an improved financial position. The improved financial position lowers
the premium on external funds and boosts the investment spending of
constrained firms. In this manner, investment expenditures are more
responsive to innovations in current earnings than the neoclassical
model would suggest.
To test this hypothesis of "excess sensitivity" of investment to cash
flow, past researchers regressed investment on Tobin’s Q and either
current or past earnings.14 The identifying assumption of this approach
is that Tobin’s Q adequately proxies for future profit opportunities
through the forward-looking behavior captured by the stock market.15
To the extent that current or past earnings still had explanatory power
for investment--even after controlling for future profit opportunities
through Tobin’s Q--they did so because of credit market frictions. This
identification scheme, however, was called into serious doubt by re-
searchers who found either little observable relationship between in-
that are not publicly traded. In addition, the firm-level QFR data provide information for
the retail, wholesale, and mining sectors of the economy. Unlike the case of the manu-
facturing sector, the sampling of these sectors is not comprehensive; income and balance
sheet statements are provided only for firms with assets above $50 million; see Long and
Ravencraft (1993) and Zakraj~ek (1995) for detailed descriptions of the firm-level QFR data
base.
14 The most influential paper in the literature is Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1988). Other examples include Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989), Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1991), Blundell, Bond, Devereux, and Schiantarelli (1992), Chirinko and
Schaller (1993), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), and Schaller (1993).
is Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of the firm divided by the replacement
value of its capital stock. The market value includes the stock market value of equity and
the market value of debt outstanding. According to the Q theory of investment, Tobin’s Q
represents the shadow value of an additional dollar of investment. Thus, when Q is
greater than one, the value of an additional unit of investment inside the firm is greater
than its replacement cost and the firm should invest more.148 Simon G. Gilchrist and Egon Zakraj~ek
vestment and Q or implausibly high adjustment cost estimates (low Q
coefficients). These results suggest that Tobin’s Q is not an adequate
proxy for future profit opportunities. Since, in principle, Tobin’s Q
measures the present value of future earnings streams attributable to
new investment, cash flow might help predict this stream, in which case
one could not attribute the large, positive coefficient on cash flow solely
to financial effects.
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1994) (G-H hereafter) formalize this
point by using a VAR forecasting framework to decompose the effect of
cash flow on investment into two separate components--a component
that forecasts future profitability under perfect capital markets, and a
residual component that may be attributable to financial frictions. The
results of their methodology provide the following insights for identifi-
cation of credit effects. By relying on Tobin’s Q to control for future
profit opportunities, rather than a VAR-based alternative that controls
for predictive power of cash flow, one dramatically overstates the effect
of cash flow on investment. This is especially true for firms classified as
financially "unconstrained" and for which Tobin’s Q is a particularly
bad proxy for future profit opportunities. Thus, without properly
controlling for such profit opportunities, even large firms with commer-
cial paper ratings appear overly responsive to cash flow shocks, relative
to the perfect markets benchmark. Once one controls for the forecasting
power of cash flow, however, all evidence of excess sensitivity disap-
pears for "unconstrained" firms, and it is reduced for "constrained"
firms.
The other lesson for the identification of credit effects provided by
G-H is that although the level of response of investment to cash flow
effect differs substantially with and without controlling for the forecast-
ing component, the difference in the response of investment to cash
flow across constrained and unconstrained subgroups is actually
greater, once one controls for the predictive content of cash flow for
future profit opportunities. This result is encouraging because it sug-
gests that even if we cannot correctly identify the underlying investment
model, by making comparisons across subgroups of firms we are still
likely, to obtain a reasonably correct answer for the degree of excess
sensitivity of constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms. 16
While the G-H results are informative, it is not clear how robust
they are to alternative time frames, data sets, and forecasting rules. The
last are particularly important, since G-H rely on a VAR forecast that is
16 It is worth emphasizing that many papers in the literature, including Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), either explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the identification
problems posed by using Tobin’s Q and are more likely to rely on comparisons across
firms rather than focus on the overall cash flow coefficient, when assessing the importance
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restricted to be common across all manufacturing firms, once they con-
trol for fixed firm and time effects. To the extent that such a restriction is
invalid, we may not obtain a good proxy for future profit opportunities
and may seriously bias the parameter estimates on cash flow.
Gilchrist and Zakrajgek (1995) investigate this point using the
quarterly frequency, firm-level QFR data. The application of the VAR-
based measure of profit opportunities is particularly important for the
QFR data set, since many of the firms in the sample are not publicly
traded and, therefore, do not have a stock-market-based measure of
profit opportunities available. Using the G-H methodology, Gilchrist
and Zakraj~ek (!995) compare a variety of forecasting rules, including
firm-specific, industry-specific (2-digit SIC), sector-specific (durables
versus nondurables) as well as aggregate forecasting equations, and find
the G-H results robust to these alternatives. In fact, of all forecasting
systems considered, the G-H restriction that the forecasting equation is
common across all firms in manufacturing, after controlling for fixed
firm and time effects, provides the smallest residual sensitivity of
investment to cash flow for both financially constrained and uncon-
strained subgroups. In addition, Gilchrist and Zakrajgek (1995) confirm
the G-H result that unconstrained subgroups show no excess sensitivity
of investment to cash flow, once one controls for cash flow’s forecasting
power of future profit streams. Nonetheless, a large residual correlation
remains between investment and cash flow for constrained subgn’oups,
even after controlling for the predictive power of cash flow for fut~ure
profit opportunities. In fact, Gilchrist and Zakrajgek (1995) find that the
investment of constrained firms is just as responsive to cash flow shocks
as it is to future profit opportunities, with an elasticity around 0.12. This
latter finding, combined with the fact that, by their definition, finan-
cially constrained firms account for over 30 percent of tt’~e capital stock in
the economy, strongly suggests that financial frictions are an important
determinant of business fixed investment in the manufacturing sector.
The methodology used by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1994) and
Gilchrist and Zakraj~ek (1995) follows that of numerous other research-
ers who start with a well-specified investment equation and then look
for departures from this equation that are consistent with a model based
on financial frictions. The alternative model under imperfect capital
markets is neither specified nor estimated. Therefore, although these
exercises are useful in providing evidence against the null hypothesis of
perfect capital markets, they do not provide an alternative set of
parameter estimates that can be used to identify the decision rule of the
financially constrained firm. A major limitation is the difficulty involved
in specifying the alternative, since theoretical models incorporating
credit frictions are either too simple or too intractable to be tested by
empirical data.
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with financial frictions that can be tested empirically. One approach is to
specify ad hoc, realistic rules that govern a firm’s ability to obtain
external funds and then solve the model using numerical techniques.
Gross (1994) is a recent example of this approach. Not only does Gross
(1994) specify the alternative to the perfect capital market case, but he
also takes the model to data by estimating the reduced-form of the
decision rule using non-parametric methods. While the reduced-form
results provide additional evidence in favor of a credit mechanism for
firm-level investment, we still do not obtain the underlying parameter
estimates that are necessary to fully evaluate the decision rule and, thus,
to quantify the overall importance of credit for investment spending. For
this type of exercise, we must still rely on reduced-form interpretations
of the data.
Identification of capital market frictions using reduced-form equa-
tions at the micro level depends on methods similar to those used with
time series data. The point is to develop empirical evidence that is
consistent with a model based on capital market frictions but would be
much more difficult to explain in a world where such frictions were
absent. For example, although we would expect cash flow to be an
important explanatory variable for investment even in the absence of
capital market frictions, this is not so obviously true for inventories,
since nearly all structural models of inventory behavior rely on sales
rather than profits as the principal determinant of optimal inventory
investment. In addition, to the extent that cash flow has greater
explanatory power for firms that are likely to be constrained, we have
further evidence in favor of a financial markets imperfection story.17
This identification scheme is used by Zakraj~ek (1994) to measure
the importance of financial frictions in the retail sector, using a sample
constructed from thefirm-level QFR data. The advantage of the data set
that provides information on non-publicly traded firms is particularly
important for the retail trade, where a much lower proportion of total
assets is held by publicly traded firms. The focus on inventory invest-
ment in retail trade is motivated by the fact that inventory investment in
this sector is the most volatile component of aggregate inventory
investment (see Blinder and Maccini 1991). Both the cross-sectional and
the time series results from Zakraj~ek (1994) are consistent with the
presence of a financial accelerator in the retail trade sector. First, cash
flow is, both statistically and economically, a significant predictor of
inventory investment for firms with "weak" balance sheet conditions--
that is, firms with large debt burdens and no access to the commercial
17 Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) and Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen (1993)
provide recent evidence on the importance of internal finance for manufacturing inventory
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paper market.18 Second, the predictive power of cash flow for inventory
growth of firms with weak balance sheet conditions is highly asymmet-
ric over the course of the business cycle, increasing considerably in
recessions relative to normal times.
Some New Results from Firm-Level QFR Data
While the results of Zakrajgek (1994) are interesting, it is important
to examine their robustness across broader sectors of the economy.
Accordingly, we apply the identification scheme used in Zakraj~ek
(1994) to a similarly constructed, firm-level QFR data set for the
manufacturing sector. We estimate an inventory regression that in-
cludes lags of both inventories and sales in order to capture desired
inventory behavior, and lagged cash flow to capture a financial effect.
We rank observations based on last period’s net leverage ratio and split
the data into four quartiles based on this ranking.19 The details of the
exact econometric specification and data construction are provided in
the appendix.
Table 4 provides the first set of estimation results. It compares the
response of inventory investment to cash flow shocks across the four
subsets of firms, classified by leverage. All four categories show a
positive response of inventory investment to cash flow, with the
coefficient on cash flow increasing monotonically across the four lever-
age categories. The monotonic increase in cash flow coefficients is
consistent with the view that internal funds are an important determi-
nant of inventory investment for financially constrained firms. None-
theless, the fact that inventory investment of firms in the lowest quartile
of the net leverage distribution responds to cash flow is difficult to
interpret, and it highlights the costs of eschewing structural models
even as benchmarks. An extreme interpretation would attribute all of
the explanatory power of cash flow to the effect of capital market
frictions. An alternative interpretation would attribute the explanatory
power of cash flow for low net leverage firms to an underlying perfect
capital markets model and attribute the differential effect across different
quartiles to capital market frictions. Even with this more restrictive
~8 Zakraj~ek (1994) relies on a "netqeverage" measure of balance sheet conditions
proposed by Sharpe (1994) and recently used by Calomiris, Orphanides, and Sharpe (1994).
19 It is worth noting that the choice of sample-splitting criterion is also a relevant
identification issue. Although we do not explicitly address the issue in this paper,
evidence on the importance of financial effects in micro spending equations is robust to a
wide variety of sample-splitting methodologies, using both exogenously determined
criteria such as size, dividend policy, and ownership structure (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) and
Ng and Schaller (1993)) and endogenously determined criteria derived from switching
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Table 4
The Effect of Cash Flow on Manufacturing Inventory Investment
Dependent Variable: AlnNit
Quartile I Quartile II Quartile III Quartile IV
In(N/S)~ .145 .124 .127 .161
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
In(N._llS~t) -.144 -.124 -.127 -.169
(.003) (.o04) (.o04) (.0o4)
.~ In Nit_1 -.145 -.085 -.081 -.028
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
& In S.-1 -.081 -.067 -.072 -.069
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
~[it- 1 / TAit-2 .282 .396 .493 .582
(.031) (.027) (.035) (.040)
~ .098 .077 .074 .088
Observations 29,612 29,869 29,575 28,484
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, All equations included fixed time effects (not reported) and are
estimated with OLS. A minimum of 8 quarters and up to 51 quarters of data were used to compute a
consistent estimate (the sample mean) of the firm-specific inventory-sales target ratio (N/S)i. The log of
this variable is included to control for fixed individual effects. Sample range: 1979:QII1-1991 :QIII.
interpretation, we have substantial evidence of excess sensitivity of
inventory investment to earnings, for high net leverage firms.
While Table 4 provided information on the average response of
inventories to cash flow across the full sample, Table 5 provides
information on the cyclicality of the response over the business cycle.
We do this by reestimating the inventory equation across two-year
subintervals for firms divided into two categories low and high net
leverage.20 In Table 5, we report the cash flow coefficient and its
standard error for both the low and high net leverage categories in each
subsample. We also report the differential response of inventories to
cash flow shocks across the two subgroups as well as the associated
standard errors. Table 5 clearly shows the cyclical nature of the impor-
tance of internal funds for inventory investment. The highest differential
responses occur in the 1980-1982 downturn and following the 1989
monetary contraction that preceded the 1990 recession. In these epi-
sodes, the differential effect of cash flow on inventory investment is
nearly twice as high as in 1985-86, the period with the lowest differential
response.
It is worth emphasizing that the findings here come not from small
20 The low net leverage observations represent the firms with net leverage less than
the median value over the two-year estimafion period. We use two rather than four
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Table 5
The Effect of Cash Flow on Manufacturing Inventory Investment
Asymmetric Effects over the Business Cycle
Time Period Unconstraineda Constrainedb Differencec
79:QIII-80:QIV .384 .612 .228
(.052) (.065) (.083)
81 :QI-82:QIV .320 .649 .329
(.055) (.067) (.087)
83:QI-84:QIV .410 .552 .142
(.055) (.070) (.089)
85:QI-86:QIV .395 .526 .131
(.056) (.058) (.081)
87:QI-88:QtV .357 .540 .183
(.051) (.065) (.083)
89:QI-90:QIV .247 .564 .317
(.056) (.076) (.094)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All equations included fixed time effects (not repo~ted) and are
estimated with OLS. A minimum of 8 quarters and up to 51 quarters of data were used to compute a
consistent estimate (the sample mean) of the firm-specific inventory-sales target ratio (N/S)i. The log of
this variable is inoluded to control for fixed individual effects. Sample range: 1979:Qlll-1991:QIV,
’~ Point estimates on cash flow for firms in Quartiles I and II.
b Point estimates on cash flow for firms in Quartiles Ill and IV.
° Difference in point estimates on cash flow between constrained and unconstrained firms.
versus large firm comparisons as in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), but
from a sample of firms classified by financial policy. As such, one cannot
easily explain away the differences in inventory investment response by
attributing them to unmodeled industry or size effects. In addition,
besides providing independent support for the idea that the differential
inventory behavior between firms documented by Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) is driven by financial factors, this evidence confirms the findings
of Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) on the cyclical nature of credit
effects in inventory equations.
While these regressions provide strong micro evidence in support
of a financial accelerator for inventory investment, it is important to ask,
"Why do these differential effects matter in the aggregate?" Although a
complete answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, we
provide two pieces of evidence to suggest they would indeed matter.
We proceed by calculating the share of inventories that would fall into
the two quartiles with high net leverage (that is, firms above the 50th
percentile of the net leverage distribution). This percentage is plotted in
Figure 2. This figure has two noteworthy aspects. First, high net
leverage firms account for a significant share of inventories--at least 30
percent. Second and more striking, the share of inventories held by high
net leverage firms rises dramatically following tight-money episodes154 Simon G. Gilchrist and Egon Zakraj~ek
Figure 2
THE RELATIVE ~MPORTANCE OF FINANCIALLY
CONSTRAINED FIRMS
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Note: Dashed lines represent Romer dates. The shaded regions represent
NBER-dated recessions. Seasonally adjusted data.
and during recessions, with at least a 15 percent increase during the
1981-82 recession and a steady climb after the onset of tight money in
1989 through the 1991 recession. Based on this evidence, it is easy to see
how one could obtain asymmetric responses of inventory investment to
financial conditions using the aggregate data. As more firms become
highly indebted throughout the economic downturn, and as the respon-
siveness to earnings of highly indebted firms increases throughout the
downturn, the amplification effects associated with the financial accel-
erator become more relevant for aggregate economic activity.
CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the issues surrounding the identification and
quantification of the effects of financial market imperfections on firm
behavior. The paper emphasizes the essential role that heterogeneity
plays in assessing the importance of credit market frictions, and the
need for data sets that accurately reflect such heterogeneity when
measuring the relevance of financial frictions. The paper also provides
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particular, we find substantial evidence that small-firm versus large-firm
borrowing has predicfive power for a variety of measures of aggregate
economic activity. We also find that monetary policy has a substantial
influence over the differential behavior of these debt variables, with a
tightening of monetary policy leading to a drop in small-firm debt
relative to large-firm debt. "
Using firm-level data, we find substantial evidence that inventory
investment is highly responsive to the availability of internal funds, for
firms that find themselves in weak balance sheet positions. In addition,
the percentage of manufacturing inventories held by such firms in-
creases dramatically during economic downturns, making overall inven-
tory investment much more sensitive to balance sheet conditions during
such periods of low economic activity. Overall, these results provide
substantial support for the view that a credit mechanism plays an
important role in conditioning the macroeconomy’s response to under-
lying economic disturbances.
Appendix
From the certainty component of the firm-level QFR data base, we selected an
unbalanced panel of firms from 1979:QI through 1991:QIII.21 From this unbalanced panel,
we dropped all firms that had tenure of less than 8 quarters or had any discontinuities in
their time series record.
Inventories: The QFR data report the book value of total inventories. Firms in the
sample were required to hold strictly positive inventories at each point of their
tenure in the panel. In order to eliminate the inflation bias from the inventory
growth rate, inventory stocks were deflated by the implicit GNP deflator prior to
constructing growth rates. We let Nit denote the real value of inventories of firm i
in period t.
Sales: To construct a real measure of sales, the reported nominal value of sales was
deflated by the implicit GNP price deflator. As with inventories, firms were
required to have strictly positive sales at each point of their tenure in the panel. We
let Sit denote the real value of sales of firm i in period t.
Internal Finance: The measure of internal funds in this paper is defined as cash
flow relative to last period’s total assets. Cash flow is defined as income (or loss)
from operations plus depreciation, depletion, and amortization of property, plant,
and equipment. Both cash flow and the book value of total assets are deflated by
the implicit GNP price deflator prior to constructing the internal finance ratio. We
let IIit/TAit_I denote the ratio of real profits of firm i in period t to its real assets in
period t - 1.
Net Leverage: Financial leverage (the ratio of total debt to total assets) is normally
thought of as a measure of a firm’s balance sheet condition. A potential problem
with identification strategy that classifies firms into "constrained" and "uncon-
strained" subgroups according to leverage ratio is that total assets consist of a
variety of different assets. In particular, a highly liquid component of total assets,
in addition to cash stocks, includes time deposits, CDs, and other readily mar-
ketable securities that can be quickly and at little cost converted to cash-on-hand
21 Even though the firm-level QER data are available from 1977:QI-1991:QIII, we
started our sample in 1979:QI, because the 1978:QIV data are missing and we wanted to
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and used to finance inventory investment if internal funds are low and external
credit is unavailable; see Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) for the evidence of this
phenomenon during the 1982 recession. A more comprehensive measure of a
firm’s overall balance sheet condition is, according to Sharpe (1994), the net
leverage. The measure of net leverage is constructed by subtracting a firm’s net
short-term assets from both the numerator and the denominator of a firm’s
leverage ratio. Net short-term assets consist of cash stock, all short-term invest-
ment, and trade receivables, minus trade payables.
Quartiles: In each period t, a firm is assigned to one of four quartiles, based on its
t - 1 period’s net leverage. The first quartile contains all firms with net leverage
below the 25th percentile; the second quartile contains all firms with net leverage
between the 25th and the 50th percentiles; the third quartile contains all firms
between the 50th and 75th percentiles; and, finally, the fourth quartile contains all
firms with net-leverage above the 75th percentile. We allow the cutoff points (that
is, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles) to vary over time by computing them for
each year of our sample separately. For example, a firm in 1980:QII is assigned to
the first quartile if its net leverage in 1980:QI is less than the 25th percentile of the
net leverage distribution computed over all four quarters of the year 1980.
We use the following econometric specification to measure the effect of credit
frictions on inventory investment:
The dependent variable is the growth rate of inventories. The first two terms reflect the
effect of the deviation of the current log inventory/sales ratio from its firm-specific target,
ln(N/S)i. A consistent estimate of the target inventory/sales ratio for firm i is computed
according to
N)    1
In ~" i= ~ ~ (in Nit - In Sit),
t=l
where Ti denotes the number of quarters that firm i is in the sample (a minimum of 8
quarters and a maximum of 51 quarters)¯ The lag of [Iit/TAit_1 is meant to capture the effect
of financial frictions on inventory investment; the fixed time effect, dr, is added to control
for aggregate shocks such as overall price movements or interest rate shocks, while lags of
~ In Nit and A In Sit are included to capture any additional short-run dynamics¯
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William C. Brainard*
It is a pleasure to discuss Simon Gilchrist and Egon Zakraj~ek’s
stimulating paper on the importance of credit for macroeconomic
activity. The authors and others at this conference are to be commended
for their efforts to improve our understanding of the role of bank
lending in the monetary transmission mechanism and the extent to
which market imperfections may be important in shaping that role. I will
begin with some general remarks about the dichotomy drawn between
the "money" and "credit" views of the transmission mechanism, and
then make some specific comments about the authors’ analysis and
conclusions.
THE MONEY AND CREDIT VIEWS
At such a conference 30 years ago, the debate might have focused
on whether the quantity of money affected expenditure directly or
through interest rates. In the current discussion, the "money view" has
been identified as the view that monetary policy works through its effect
on the cost of capital, rather than through credit. The view of the cost of
capital itself could be quite narrow, limited to a single or limited number
of market interest rates, or it could be quite broad, reflecting the prices
and rates of return on a wide spectrum of assets and liabilities and
stretching all the way to equities and the market value of firms.
Many monetary economists, for example, Brunner-Meltzer and
Tobin-Brainard, recognizing the wide spectrum of financial assets and
institutions in our highly developed economy, have long taken the
*Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics, Yale University.160 William C. Brainard
broad view of the cost of capital. This view is entirely consistent with
asset demands and supply of credit by bank and nonbank intermediar-
ies playing an important role in the transmission of monetary policy. In
this view, the markets for "credit" and monetary assets are highly inter-
dependent, with financial intermediaries, households, and firms inter-
acting in many markets. Hence, it suggests that the magnitude of the
response to monetary policy of interest rates and broader measures of
the cost to capital such as Tobin’s q is importantly affected by the behavior
of a broad array of financial markets and institutions. So the broad
"money" view is quite different from the stylized picture that has become
popular in the money versus credit debate, in which there is clear sepa-
ration between the two channels~a money channel that goes from money
directly to the cost of capital, and a credit channel that traces the effect
through the asset side of banks and other intermediaries. As might be
expected, I am not a fan of this dichotomy and prefer to analyze the
transmission of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model in which
the interdependencies of markets are explicitly recognized.
The current "credit view" stresses still another aspect of financial
markets and the transmission mechanism, the presence of imperfections
in credit and capital markets reflecting significant costs of gathering
information and monitoring. Recent theoretical work has formalized
and clarified the difficulties for financial markets implied by the presence
of asymmetric information and moral hazard. Such phenomena have
long been recognized and included in the catalog of reasons for credit
rationing, collateral requirements, and other terms and conditions in
financial contracts, and indeed for the existence of specialized financial
intermediaries themselves. When Franco Modigliani attempted to cap-
ture the monetary transmission mechanism in the early versions of the
MPS model many years ago, it seemed essential to include quantities of
deposit and credit flows. Market interest rates and the rates on mort-
gages and commercial loans did not appear to capture adequately the
effect of monetary events on economic activity. I applaud the resurgence
of interest in these phenomena and in the more rigorous analysis of their
theoretical foundations, but I find it somewhat ironic that this attention
comes at a time when one might suspect that their quantitative impor-
tance has declined.
Market imperfections are a matter of degree: The markets for many
commodities are imperfect and the textbook model of perfect competiw
tion is a caricature of reality, but we do not usually argue that such
imperfections negate the central role we attribute to prices in allocating
resources. At a formal level, these imperfections, which may drive a
wedge between the shadow price (or rate of return) on internal funds
and external rates, can be explicitly modeled in an equilibrium model of .
financial markets. For many of the issues raised at this conference,
however, I do not think that it is a gross error simply to regardDISCUSSION 161
information asymmetries and moral hazard as among the many reasons
it is important to treat the assets and liabilities of firms and various
intermediaries as less than perfect substitutes. In the equilibrium system
of James Tobin, however, distinguishing between "’low-quality" and
"high-quality" firms does require disaggregation of firms, distinguish-
ing the required rates of return or Tobin’s q for different types of firms.
~NNOVATION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY
One issue discussed at this conference can be addressed in this
framework without modification. This is whether the growth of non-
banking intermediaries and financial innovations--new financial instru-
ments and financial markets--destroys the effectiveness of a monetary
policy that focuses on the reserves of a single intermediary, banks.
Multi-asset equilibrium models show that for a wide range of substitut-
abilities among various assets and liabilities, monetary policy remains
effective. Innovations may change the bang per buck, but as long as the
dose of medicine can be adjusted for its effectiveness, this is not by itself
reason for alarm. But the same innovations that decrease the expected
bang per buck may also reduce the predictability of the effect of policy
actions, or even increase the magnitude of the shocks with which
monetary policy has to cope. So this analysis left many of us concerned
about potential loss of monetary control. But so far the loss of control
has not materialized. It is not even clear that monetary policy is less
effective, requiring more vigorous actions by the monetary authorities to
have the same effects. While it is always possible that with even greater
proliferation of competitors for banks, and new substitutes for their
assets and liabilities, policy effectiveness will suffer, I do not think we
have immediate cause for alarm.
One of the predictions of these models does appear to have come
true. These models always predicted that the relationship between
output and the quantities of any particular notion of money was likely to
be unreliable. Indeed, one feature of such models is that the quantities
of particular near moneys or financial assets might even move opposite
to the direction of narrowly defined money. So while financial innova-
tions do not appear to have become a major problem for the conduct of
monetary policy focusing on interest rates and user costs, they have
perhaps fatally wounded monetary aggregate targets as a guide to policy.
MARKET ~MPERFECTIONS AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
~NTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FINANCE
Although I am not a fan of the dichotomy between the money and
credit views emphasized in much recent literature, I am a fan of the
efforts to understand better the role of financial market imperfections in162 William C. Brainard
the transmission of policy. We do not live in an Arrow-Debreu world, or
even a Modigliani-Miller world, in which a separation exists between
the financial structure of a firm and its investment decisions. Asymmet-
ric information and moral hazard, stressed by the authors and by much
of the recent literature, are almost surely reasons for a wedge between
the cost of internal and external funds. This literature tends to stress the
need to compensate lenders for the cost of gathering information and
monitoring, and for the risks and losses reflecting moral hazard that
remain even after incurring those costs. Hence the premium shows up
on the supply side, as in Gilchrist and Zakraj~ek’s Figure 1.
It is interesting to note that Meyer and Kuh, in their classic work The
Investment Decision, stress the other side of the market in arguing that a
wedge exists between the internal and external costs of capital. They
emphasize reasons why the borrowers, managers, and entrepreneurs
impute a higher cost to external than to internal funds. Arguing that in
the modern firm there is a substantial separation of ownership and
control, they give a long list of reasons for a preference for internal
finance: bankruptcy and loss of their job, dilution of control, imposition
by creditors of covenants and restrictions on their behavior, a minor
share in equity returns. These reasons for a wedge are in the same spirit
as, and complementary to, the reasons emphasized by the authors of the
paper under discussion. I wish we knew more about the magnitude of
both of these sources of market imperfection. My own guess is that the
sources stressed by Meyer and Kuh are even more important than those
emphasized by Gilchrist and Zakraj~ek.
It would be very instructive, but probably quite difficult, to obtain
quantitative measures of the magnitude of the wedge and of its sources
on each side of the market. It is probably easier to get measures of the
lender’s premium because the lender’s costs are more readily identified
and because data on the lending of financial institutions are more readily
available than the information required to estimate the borrower’s
premium. To my knowledge, remarkably little work of this sort has been
done since the early work by Don Hester which investigated "the
commercial loan offer function" and attempted to determine how the
terms and conditions of bank loans, and their profitability, depend upon
the characteristics of the borrowers. I hope such studies will be on the
agenda for future research.
One could believe that a wedge is present between the costs of
internal and external funds for the typical firm but not believe in the
"financial accelerator," which creates a systematic variation in the
wedge over the cycle or with the tightness of monetary policy. However
difficult it is to get a precise estimate of the magnitude of the average
wedge, it is going to be even more so to get at the more subtle question
of its cyclical variation. My own guess is that much of the time, and for
many cycles, the financial accelerator is relatively unimportant, but thatDISCUSSION 163
in episodes like the recent New England experience, the accelerator is
at work in an important way. The lesson is not to assume that what you
see every day is what you are going to see in the extreme; and monetary
authorities are well advised to worry about the increased sensitivity of
response to their actions in circumstances where unusually large num-
bers of firms have unusually high leverage or low coverage.
TESTING THE USEFULNESS OF CREDIT FLOWS IN
PREDICTING ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
One way to test for the presence of financial market imperfections
is to examine the value of the borrowing rates of "low-quality" firms
relative to "high-quality" firms in predicting aggregate variables. The
authors report four sets of vector autoregressions testing the usefulness
of such variables in forecasting economic activity. They find that in
bivariate regressions relating various debt measures to GNP, industrial
production, inventories, and employment, the ratio of the short-term
debt of small manufacturing firms to that of all manufacturing firms
does well. In their words, the results provide "strong support for the
hypothesis that credit flows between small and large firms predict real
economic activity.’" However, as the authors note, there is an awkward-
ness, in that the predictive power of this variable is captured almost
entirely by the quantity of large-firm, short-term debt; large-firm debt is
significantly and negatively related to economic activity. Small-firm debt
has a positive but insignificant effect.
The authors downplay this result, noting that the predictive power
of the small/all mix remains when other variables, including the federal
funds rate and inflation, are included. They also note that with the
inclusion of such variables, the predictive power of large-firm debt
variables is diminished. In these multivariate VARs, the only case where
large-firm debt by itself is even marginally significant is the case of
inventories. In these multivariate regressions, I am puzzled by the
difference in results for the exclusion tests and for the tests on the sum
of coefficients. For example, the sum of coefficients for large-firm,
short-term debt is significant for both industrial production and employ-
ment, but not for inventories, whereas according to the exclusion tests
it is most significant for inventories. Of course this result is logically
possible, but with the number of degrees of freedom it seems somewhat
surprising. The sensitivity of results to the precise specification is
disconcerting and suggests that the power of the tests is low; in any
case, it may be desirable to downplay the significance of the bivariate
results. The authors also note that, contrary to the suggestion of the
theory, the ratio of bank loans to bank loans plus commercial paper
does not do too well--it is only marginally significant in the bivariate
regressions.164 William C. Brainard
How are we to interpret the success of the ratio of small-firm to
all-firm debt in predicting economic activity, particularly when small-
firm debt by itself does not to appear to play a particularly important
role? One possibility is that it simply reflects the nonlinear treatment of
large-firm debt, which does so well in the bivariate regressions and
which enters in the denominator in these regressions. Another possi-
bility is that small-firm and large-firm debt move together much of the
time, but that during downturns or credit crunches, something special
happens that is picked up by the ratio. Possibly the variable is a proxy
for a subsample of the period that is particularly important for the
results for example, the highly inflationary period at the end of the
1970s and the tight money period that followed. This suggests, together
with the significant changes in institutions, regulations, and market
instruments over the sample period, the desirability of testing for the
stability of the relationships over time. In the same spirit, the presump-
tion that a firm’s financial conditions are nonlinearly related to borrow-
ing premiums suggests examining special episodes--credit crunches or
periods of widespread financial stress--where these effects would be
largest. While the authors do not report such tests for the VARs, they do
follow this strategy when they explore the effect of cash flow on
inventories.
Just as it is interesting to know what we can infer about future
economic activity from the debt variables, it is desirable to have some
sense of the proximate determinants of the debt variables themselves.
The authors provide a set of VARs that include the debt variables, the
federal funds rate, and, in some cases, industrial production. In the
bivariate VARs the federal funds rate appears to have a significant effect
on small-firm and large-firm bank and other debt, as well as on the
small/all mix. However, the significance of the federal funds rate is
reduced when industrial production is included, suggesting that much
of this effect is indirect; it appears that economic activity, which could be
affecting either the demand for or the supply of credit, is the major
determinant of the debt variables.
The authors also exploit the firm-level QFR data to examine the
sensitivity of inventory investment to cash flow, controlling for sales
and a firm-specific inventory/sales ratio. Classifying firms into four
categories by leverage, they find that the higher the leverage, the larger
the effect of cash flow on inventory holdings, suggesting highly levered
firms have a larger external finance premium. The use of firm data also
provides the degrees of freedom to enable them to estimate the
importance of cash flow for two-year subperiods. An interesting and
suggestive finding is that the differential response for low- and high-
leverage firms, always in the expected direction and frequently signifi-
cant, is most dramatic in the 1980-82 downturn and following the
monetary contraction in 1989. The authors calculate that the share ofDISCUSSION 165
inventories that falls into the high-leverage category not only is signif-
icant but rises dramatically following tight-money episodes and during
recessions. These results suggest that the credit effects are not only
significant in the aggregate but likely to become even more important in
sustained downturns.
In closing, I would like to congratulate the authors for producing an
interesting and stimulating paper. It is an excellent model of how to use
firm-level data to shed light on the behavior of the aggregate economy
and on the interplay between financial and real activity. Yet much
remains to be done, and I look forward to the next installments.S~ephen D. Oliner*
Over the past few years, the team of Mark Gertler, Simon Gilchrist,
and Egon Zakraj~ek has produced important research on the transmis-
sion of monetary policy. Their work has highlighted the differential
effect of policy actions on small and large firms, based on a careful
analysis of data presented in the Census Bureau’s Quarterly Financial
Report for Manufacturing, Mining and Trade Corporations, the so-called QFR
data. This experience makes Gilchrist and Zakraj~ek eminently qualified
to write the paper for this session of the conference.
The core of their paper is a progress report on research using the
QFR data. Most of the results will be familiar to readers who have
followed this literature, but the authors also present several new
findings. The results, they argue, provide compelling evidence in favor
of an important credit channel for monetary policy, especially one that
operates beyond the confines of the banking sector. I agree with most of
the points in the paper. In particular, I am persuaded that a credit
channel does exist and that bank loans are not the sole vehicle for this
channel. However, in my view, the research to date has yet to establish
that the credit channel is a consistently important part of the transmis-
sion mechanism. Much further research is needed, both to determine
the aggregate importance of the credit channel and to expand our still
incomplete understanding of the differential effects of monetary policy.
Before turning to more specific comments, it may be helpful to
*Chief, Capital Markets Section, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The author thanks Steven Sharpe for helpful
suggestions on an earlier draft. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author
alone and should not be attributed to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System or its staff.DISCUSSION 167
clarify some terminology concerning a credit channel for monetary
policy. The paper correctly distinguishes two possible forms of the credit
channel. In the first, which the authors call simply the "credit channel,"
policy actions affect the supply of loans from commercial banks and
other depositories and, in turn, the real spending of borroWers with
limited access to nonbank funding. Because this channel ascribes a
special role to banks, I will refer to it as the "bank credit channel,"
eschewing the less precise term used in the paper. The second possible
form of a credit channel emphasizes capital market imperfections that
have nothing to do with banks per se. That is, owing to information
asymmetries, some borrowers must pay a premium to obtain external
finance. Monetary contractions can magnify this premium by worsening
the balance sheets of such borrowers. The authors call this mechanism
the "financial accelerator." However, to draw a sharper contrast with
the transmission channel that stresses the role of banks, I will term this
mechanism the "broad credit channel."
REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF MAIN RESULTS
The paper begins by arguing that aggregate data are useless for
assessing the existence or importance of either version of the credit
channel. This point is surely correct and indeed has become the
conventional wisdom in recent years. The basic problem is that aggre-
gate data cannot distinguish shifts in loan supply from shifts in loan
demand. Evidence that both output and borrowing drop after a mone-
tary contraction does not identify whether the decline in loan volume
reflects a constriction of loan supply or a dampening of loan demand
through the traditional interest rate mechanism. Given this severe
identification problem, researchers have focused on the behavioral
differences across firms to test for a credit channel. All the QFR research
reported in the paper follows this testing strategy.
As noted in the introduction, the paper builds a strong case for the
existence of a credit channel. The authors present several lines of
evidence to make this case, relying mostly on results obtained from
research with the QFR data. I will briefly review the principal conclu-
sions to be drawn from this research.
The first conclusion is that monetary policy actions have a much stronger
effect on small firms than on large firms. This was clearly established in
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), who used QFR data for the manufacturing
sector to examine the effects of monetary contractions. After a shift to
tight money, they find that sales, inventories, and short-term debt all
contract at small firms relative to large firms. A skeptic could argue that
these differences reflect unequal shifts in demand faced by small and
large firms, rather than the operation of a credit channel. However,
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994) show that the relative contraction168 Stephen D. Oliner
of small firms persists after controlling for differences in the industry
mix of the two groups.
Moreover, considerable evidence suggests that a credit channel of some
type operates for small firms. The first strand of evidence concerns the
behavior of the inventory-sales ratio and the ratio of short-term debt to
sales across small and large firms. As shown in Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994), both ratios rise at large manufacturing firms after a monetary
contraction, as these firms apparently borrow to finance an unexpected
inventory accumulation and, more generally, to smooth through an
unanticipated drop in cash flow. In contrast, these ratios increase little if
at all for small firms, suggesting that they have limited access to the
credit needed to perform this smoothing. The second strand is the large
body of work that documents the "excess" sensitivity of inventory
accumulation and fixed investment of small firms to balance sheet
conditions. The paper discusses much of this work-~especially that
based on QFR data--and adds several new results that bolster the
conclusions of the existing literature. This research implies that mone-
tary policy operates, in part, through a credit channel for small firms by
affecting the health of their balance sheets and hence their access to
credit.
Although the precise form of this credit channel is still open to
debate, the QFR research to date is more consistent with a broad credit channel
than with one that operates exclusively through the banking sector. As shown
in Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Oliner and Rudebusch (1995a, b), and the
current paper, monetary contractions since the mid-1970s have
prompted a general reallocation of credit toward large firms but not a
significant shift in the mix of bank and nonbank debt for either small or
large firms. If monetary policy operated strictly through a bank credit
channel, we would expect to observe a decline in bank loans relative to
nonbank debt for at least some firms. The absence of such a shift in mix
argues against the bank version of the credit channel. At the same time,
the widespread diversion of credit away from small firms provides
support for the broad credit channel, which stresses the information
asymmetries faced by all lenders. That is, a move to tighter monetary
policy tends to worsen balance sheet conditions. In that environment,
firms that present severe information problems~notably, small firms--
will find that all forms of credit become less available, consistent with
the QFR results.
The authors argue not only that a credit channel exists but also that
it represents an important part of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism. They present two pieces of evidence to support this assertion.
First, they show that reallocations of credit toward large firms are
strongly associated with a subsequent weakening of aggregate activity.
Second, they note that the firms found to be credit-constrained in
various QFR studies account for a sizable part of the manufacturingDISCUSSION 169
sector--roughly one-third of the sector’s sales, inventories, and capital
stock.
Although I do not dispute these points, neither one establishes that
the credit channel is important. The basic problem is that actions by
unconstrained firms may offset the adverse effects of monetary policy on
firms that face financial constraints. For example, assume that the Fed
tightens monetary policy, reducing demand for automobiles through
the standard interest rate channel. In response, General Motors cancels
an order for auto parts with one of its small suppliers. This supplier,
already financially shaky, cannot obtain credit to offset the lost revenue
and has to shut down. However, if a larger, healthy competitor can step
in immediately and fill the firm’s remaining orders with no rise in price,
the net effect of the credit channel would be zero. If this scenario were
repeated throughout the economy, the data would show a significant
redistribution of sales from small to large firms. Yet the decline in
aggregate activity would be unrelated to the credit channel. Although
this example is admittedly extreme, it illustrates a key point: The
evidence in the paper shows only that the credit channel is potentially
important, not that it is important. No convincing case for the impor-
tance of the credit channel can be made until much more is known about
the strategic reactions of firms to the financial distress of their compet-
itors.
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Overall, the QFR research has yielded some valuable stylized facts:
(1) that small firms bear a disproportionate hit from monetary contrac-
tions, due at least in part to the operation of a credit channel, and (2) that
the credit channel does not appear to be confined to bank lending.
However, our understanding of the microeconomic mechanisms behind
these stylized facts is still seriously incomplete. The remainder of my
remarks will identify areas in which I see a high payoff from further
research.
Behavior of Nonbank Financial Institutions
To determine whether banks p!ay a special role in the transmission
of monetary policy, we need to better understand the response of
nonbank financial institutions, principally finance and insurance com-
panies, to policy actions. Such information would provide a benchmark
against which to evaluate the lending behavior of banks.
As discussed earlier, the QFR data show that monetary contractions
over the past 20 years have not significantly altered the mix of debt for
either small firms or large firms. This finding suggests that banks, as a
rule, have not tightened credit supply to a greater degree than nonbank170 Stephen D. Oliner
lenders. However, this result is based on the published QFR data, which
disaggregate total manufacturing only into broad size classes. An
obvious next step would be to repeat this analysis using the underlying
firm-level QFR data, which the authors could do rather easily. This
would indicate whether the limited disaggregation in the published QFR
data has masked interesting movements in the debt mix for individual
firms.
While that exercise would be useful, we must move beyond the
QFR data to fully understand the lending behavior of nonbank financial
institutions. Both the published QFR data and the underlying micro data
lump together all forms of nonbank debt other than commercial paper.
As a result, one cannot discern anything about the relative movements
of publicly issued bonds, loans and leases from finance companies,
private placements of debt with insurance companies and other inves-
tors, and loans from family members, friends, and other nonfinancial
businesses.
Two projects now under way at the Federal Reserve may eventually
shed light on the lending behavior of nonbank financial institutions
relative to banks after monetary shocks. Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1995)
have begun to analyze a large data set of business loans extended by
banks and finance companies to publicly traded firms, the terms of
which have been disclosed in filings to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Their results, though still quite preliminary, clearly show
that the finance companies lend, on average, to firms with weaker
balance sheets than do banks. At the same time, they find little
difference across the bank and finance company borrowers with regard
to variables often viewed as proxies for the degree of information
asymmetry--the ratio of R&D to sales, the ratio of market to book value,
the growth of sales, and firm size. These results indicate that banks have
no monopoly on lending to information problematic borrowers. Conse-
quently, one might expect their data to show that banks and finance
companies respond in a roughly similar manner to a tightening of
monetary policy.
The second project involves the analysis of data collected by the
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances, which was co-
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and the Small Business Admin-
istration. This is the second wave of the Small Business Survey; the first
was conducted in the late 1980s. Both waves collected a wealth of data
on the characteristics of small businesses and their use of financial
services. (See Cole and Wolken (1995) on the 1993 survey, and Ellie-
hausen and Wolken (1990) on the earlier survey.) The 1993 survey will
be especially valuable for comparing the behavior of banks and other
intermediaries, as it obtained information about each firm’s most recent
experience applying for credit, including applications that were denied.
Although a public-use data tape is not yet available, Federal ReserveDISCUSSION 171
staff have begun to analyze the 1993 survey data, and I would expect to
see interesting results in the near future.
Trade Credit
The role of trade credit in the monetary transmission mechanism is
a second area worthy of further research. Going back at least to Meltzer
(1960), some observers have argued that the extension of trade credit can
offset tighter loan supply at banks and other intermediaries, short-
circuiting any credit channel. That is, firms with large cash holdings or
free access to credit markets can, in effect, provide credit to constrained
firms by allowing slower payment for purchased goods. Typically, this
trade credit is believed to flow from large firms to small firms.
The analysis to date with QFR data, however, does not support the
operation of this mechanism. Both Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and
Oliner and Rudebusch (1995a) examined the movements in trade
payables for small manufacturing firms. After monetary contractions,
Oliner and Rudebusch found that small-firm trade payables declined
about in proportion with their other short-term debt, while Gertler and
Gilchrist found that trade payables actually fell as a share of such debt.
Although these results cast doubt on the Meltzer story, they are based
on the publicly available QFR data and thus do not indicate what is
happening for individual firms. It would useful to repeat this analysis
with the micro QFR data, which would show whether trade credit
functions as a substitute for other debt for certain types of small
firms~especially those with sharply deteriorating balance sheets. Case
studies likely would be of value as well. A case study could identify each
of the firm’s suppliers, enabling one to examine the behavior of trade
credit with each individually. This level of detail is needed to reconcile
the available QFR results with the notion that trade credit provides a
buffer against shortfalls in loan supply.
Heterogeneity of Small Firms
The QFR research to date has treated small firms as a homogeneous
group, showing that these firms behave differently than large firms.
This approach ignores the interesting differences within the population
of small firms. Notably, the dependence of small firms on bank loans
varies widely by firm size. For firms with fewer than 10 employees, the
1993 Small Business Survey found that only about one-third obtained
any credit at all from commercial banks. These firms often lack the track
record and collateral required to obtain loans. In contrast, more than
three-quarters of firms with 100 to 499 employees had outstanding bank
loans. This pattern suggests that a bank credit channel would be less
relevant for the smallest firms in the economy than for those slightly172 Stephen D. Oliner
further up the size distribution.2 Further study of this issue would
enhance our knowledge of the differential effects of monetary policy.
Related to this point, we need to better understand the effect of
banking relationships on credit availability for small firms. This confer-
ence has stressed the importance of these relationships, and rightly so.
From the bank’s perspective, an ongoing relationship has value because
it generates inside information about the firm that can yield monopoly
rents. Ending the relationship can be costly because the bank gives up
its monopoly power. Thus, banks must make hard decisions when
rationing credit after a monetary tightening, and one might expect a
long-standing relationship to mitigate any restriction of loan supply.
Deeper knowledge about the operation of a credit channel requires that
we investigate who gets rationed and why.
CONCLUSION
The authors should be commended for writing a useful summary of
the research on the differential effects of monetary policy on small and
large firms. They provide strong evidence that small firms contract
relatively sharply after a shift to tight monetary policy and that this
difference reflects, at least in part, the existence of a credit channel. In
addition, any such credit channel does not appear to operate exclusively
through the banking sector. However, the paper does not provide a
persuasive answer to the central issue of this conference--namely, "Is
bank lending important for the transmission of monetary policy?" This
is not a failing of the paper per se. Rather, the profession has yet to
establish that any credit channel accounts for much of the real effect of
policy actions, much less a credit channel that focuses on the role of
bank lending. My comments have outlined some avenues for fruitful
research, and clearly much work remains to be done.
2 Of course, the broad credit channel remains quite relevant for the smallest firms.
Given their limited access to bank loans and other types of credit, these firms are less able
to smooth through shocks to cash flow than are firms that face a smaller premium for
external funds.DISCUSSION 173
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